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Abstract
We study competition in a general framework introduced by Immorlica, Kalai, Lucier,
Moitra, Postlewaite, and Tennenholtz [19] and answer their main open question. Immorlica
et al. [19] considered classic optimization problems in terms of competition and introduced a
general class of games called dueling games. They model this competition as a zero-sum game,
where two players are competing for a user’s satisfaction. In their main and most natural game,
the ranking duel, a user requests a webpage by submitting a query and players output an or-
dering over all possible webpages based on the submitted query. The user tends to choose the
ordering which displays her requested webpage in a higher rank. The goal of both players is to
maximize the probability that her ordering beats that of her opponent and gets the user’s at-
tention. Immorlica et al. [19] show this game directs both players to provide suboptimal search
results. However, they leave the following as their main open question: “does competition be-
tween algorithms improve or degrade expected performance?” (see the introduction for more
quotes) In this paper, we resolve this question for the ranking duel and a more general class of
dueling games.
More precisely, we study the quality of orderings in a competition between two players.
This game is a zero-sum game, and thus any Nash equilibrium of the game can be described
by minimax strategies. Let the value of the user for an ordering be a function of the position
of her requested item in the corresponding ordering, and the social welfare for an ordering
be the expected value of the corresponding ordering for the user. We propose the price of
competition which is the ratio of the social welfare for the worst minimax strategy to the social
welfare obtained by a social planner. Finding the price of competition is another approach to
obtain structural results of Nash equilibria. We use this criterion for analyzing the quality of
orderings in the ranking duel. Although Immorlica et al. [19] show that the competition leads
to suboptimal strategies, we prove the quality of minimax results is surprisingly close to that
of the optimum solution. In particular, via a novel factor-revealing LP for computing price of
anarchy, we prove if the value of the user for an ordering is a linear function of its position, then
the price of competition is at least 0.612 and bounded above by 0.833. Moreover we consider
the cost minimization version of the problem. We prove, the social cost of the worst minimax
strategy is at most 3 times the optimal social cost.
Last but not least, we go beyond linear valuation functions and capture the main challenge for
bounding the price of competition for any arbitrary valuation function. We present a principle
which states that the lower bound for the price of competition for all 0-1 valuation functions is
the same as the lower bound for the price of competition for all possible valuation functions. It is
worth mentioning that this principle not only works for the ranking duel but also for all dueling
games. This principle says, in any dueling game, the most challenging part of bounding the price
of competition is finding a lower bound for 0-1 valuation functions. We leverage this principle
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to show that the price of competition is at least 0.25 for the generalized ranking duel, and to
find upper bounds on the price of competition for the binary search duel and the compression
duel which are introduced by Immorlica et al. [19].
1 Introduction
The conventional wisdom is that competition among suppliers will increase social welfare by pro-
viding consumers with competitive prices, high-quality products, and a wide range of options. A
classic example is the Bertrand competition [10] where suppliers compete in price to incentivize con-
sumers to buy from them and as a result the market price decreases to the point that it matches the
marginal cost of production. Indeed there are many theoretical and empirical studies for supporting
this belief in the economic literature (See, e.g., [2, 29, 25, 24]). However while in many markets
the competition steers businesses to optimize their solutions for consumers, there are competitive
markets in which businesses do not offer the best option to consumers. An interesting example
for describing this situation is a dueling game, namely, a zero-sum game where two players com-
pete to attract users. Immorlica, Kalai, Lucier, Moitra, Postlewaite, and Tennenholtz [19] showed
surprisingly if players are aimed to beat their opponents in a dueling game, they may offer users
suboptimal results. However, they raised this question regarding the efficiency of the competition as
the authors write, “Perhaps more importantly, one could ask about performance loss inherent when
players choose their algorithms competitively instead of using the (single-player) optimal algorithm.
In other words, what is the price of anarchy 1 of a given duel? ... Our main open question is (open
question 1): does competition between algorithms improve or degrade expected performance?” As
we describe below, we study this open question for a set of dueling games and in particular for the
ranking duel which is an appropriate representative of dueling games due to Immorlica et al. [19].
Dueling games. A dueling game G is a zero-sum game where two players compete for the
attention of a user 2. In a dueling game both players try to beat the other player and offer a
better option with a higher value to the user. In particular, while the user’s request is unknown to
both players and they only have access to probability distribution p, the goal for each player is to
maximize the probability that her offer is better than her opponent’s offer. This framework falls
within a general and natural class of ranking or social context games [7, 11], where each player
plays a base game separately and then ultimate payoffs are determined by both their own outcomes
and the outcomes of others. Immorlica et al. argue that this class of games models a variety of
scenarios of competitions between algorithm designers, such as, competition between search engines
(who must choose how to rank search results), or competition between hiring managers (who must
choose from a pool of candidates in the style of the secretary problem).
To be more precise a dueling game is defined by 4-tuple G = (Ω, p, S, v), where Ω is the set of all
possible requests from the user, p is a probability distribution over set Ω i.e., pω is the probability of
requesting ω ∈ Ω by the user, S is the set of all possible pure strategies for both players, and vω(s) is
the value of pure strategy s ∈ S for the user upon request ω ∈ Ω. Note that v is usually considered
to be the valuation of the players, but in this paper valuation function v denotes the value for the
user. While a mixed strategy is a probability distribution over all possible pure strategies in S, we
write the value of mixed strategy x as vω(x) = Es∼x[vω(s)].
A social planner is often interested in choosing a strategy which maximizes the social welfare,
even though it may be a bad strategy in the competition between players. This means the social
1Indeed Immorlica et al. [19] use the term of the price of anarchy in their aforementioned open question for the
same concept of the price of competition in this paper.
2One can see the user as a population of users with the same behavior.
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welfare maximizer strategy may not appear in any Nash equilibrium of the game, and thus the
competition between players results in a suboptimal outcome for the users. Knowing the fact that
Nash equilibria of a dueling game can be formed by suboptimal strategies, the following question
seems to be an important question to ask regarding the inefficiency of this competition:
What is the social welfare of any Nash equilibrium in a dueling game in comparison to
the social welfare of the optimal strategy?
Price of competition. As aforementioned while in so many cases the competition motivates
businesses to optimize their solutions for consumers, there are competitive markets and in particular
dueling games of Immorlica et al. [19], in which businesses do not offer the best option to consumers.
We define price of competition in this paper to capture this phenomenon.
First we note that since dueling games are two-player zero-sum games, Nash equilibria of these
games are characterized by minimax strategies. Therefore, one can measure the inefficiency of any
Nash equilibrium by comparing the welfare of any minimax strategy, in a game of competition
between two players, with the welfare achieved by a social welfare maximizer. We are now ready
to define the following criterion for measuring the quality of minimax strategies in a dueling game.
Definition 1.1 Price of competition (PoC) is the ratio between the social welfare of the worst
minimax strategy and the social welfare of the best possible strategy.
The proposed concept of the price of competition has the same spirit as the concept of the price
of anarchy, and both concepts try to measure the inefficiency of Nash equilibria quantitatively.
The price of anarchy, introduced by the seminal work of Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou [23], is
a well-known concept in game theory that measures the ratio of the social welfare of the worst
Nash equilibrium to the optimal social welfare. Although these two concepts are defined to capture
properties of Nash equilibria, they are meaningfully different. In the price of anarchy, the social
welfare is defined as the expected utility of all players in an equilibrium “outcome”3 which is always
zero for any zero-sum game. However, in the price of competition, the social welfare is the expected
utility of the user (which is not a player) in a minimax “strategy”. In fact, the price of competition
is aimed to analyze the impact of the competition between players on an external user.
Since the price of competition captures the inefficiency of minimax strategies in two-player
zero-sum games and all Nash equilibria of any two-player zero-sum game can be described by the
set of minimax strategies, we believe the price of competition sheds new light on the structural
analysis of Nash equilibria in two-player zero-sum games. Indeed as Alon, Demaine, Hajiaghayi,
and Leighton [5] mention understanding the structure of Nash equilibiria, and not just the price of
anarchy, is very important in general and thus our work is exactly toward this direction.
Due to the space constraints, all the missing proofs are provided in the appendices.
1.1 Our results
Ranking duel: To define the ranking duel more precisely, consider a ranking duel with two players.
When a user submits a query to a player, she is basically searching a webpage which is unknown
to the player. The player only has a prior knowledge about the requested webpage, i.e., for each
webpage the probability that this webpage is requested by the user is known. The strategy of each
player is an ordering for displaying webpages. When the requested webpage is realized, the player
which puts this webpage in a higher rank gets the user attention, and thus wins the competition.
3Which is essentially the same as the sum of utilities of all players.
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The goal of each player is to maximize the probability of winning the competition. In this situation,
a social planner who wants to minimize the expected rank of the requested webpage lists webpages
in a decreasing order of their probabilities. However, this strategy may lose the competition to
another strategy. 4
We first investigate the quality of minimax strategies and prove that surprisingly the social
welfare of any minimax strategy is not far from that of the optimal solution; it is 0.612 of the
optimal solution for the linear valuation functions and 0.25 of the optimal for any arbitrary valuation
function.
Theorem 1 Consider an instance of the raking duel. If the valuation function is a non-negative
linear function of the rank, the price of competition is at least 0.612 for |Ω| ≥ 10, and at most
0.833.
Our proof needs a careful understanding of properties for minimax strategies and has three main
steps. First, we prove nice structural properties of minimax strategies. This step is the main step
toward bounding the price of competition and gives an insight into properties of the polytope of
minimax strategies. For example for every two webpages ω1 and ω2 with pω1 > pω2 , we prove there
is a lower bound on the probability that any minimax strategy ranks webpage ω1 before webpage
ω2. In the next step, we leverage these properties to write a factor-revealing mathematical program
for bounding PoC. At last, we find a linear program where the set of its feasible solutions is a
superset of the set of feasible solutions of the former mathematical program. We find the optimal
solution of this linear program to formally prove the theorem for |Ω| ≥ 10. Moreover, we write a
computer program to find the optimal solution of the corresponding linear program and show the
price of competition is at least 0.637 for |Ω| ≥ 100 (which is slightly better the case that Ω ≥ 10).
To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to use factor-revealing techniques to bound the
inefficiency of equilibria.
Afterwards, we consider the cost minimization version of the ranking duel and prove a constant
upper bound for the social cost of the game using the same technique of Theorem 1. Note that
the only difference between the cost minimization and welfare maximization of a dueling game is
that function v is a cost function rather than a valuation function, and once a webpage is searched
the winner of the cost minimization game is the player who provides a solution with a lower cost.
Moreover, we define the PoCcost of the ranking duel as the ratio between the minimax strategy
with the highest cost and the strategy with the least cost. In the following theorem we show that
PoCcost ≤ 3.
Theorem 2 For a ranking duel with a linear cost function, we have PoCcost ≤ 3.
It is worth mentioning that the structural properties of minimax strategies do not depend on the
valuation function, and thus the polytope of minimax strategies remains unchanged for every valu-
ation function which is a decreasing (increasing) function of rank in the welfare maximization (cost
minimization) variant of the game. Therefore, we leverage structural properties of the polytope of
minimax strategies, which is presented in Theorem 1, for proving Theorem 2 and in general one
can apply our techniques for characterizing the polytope of minimax strategies for an arbitrary val-
uation function. Nevertheless, writing the factor-revealing mathematical program totally depends
on the linearity of the valuation function.
4For example consider a situation when the user submits a query and she is interested in webpages w1, w2, and w3
with probabilities 0.35, 0.33 and 0.32 respectively. In this situation the social planner ranks webpage wi at position
i, for i = 1, 2, 3. However, if a player plays based on this strategy, her opponent puts webpages w2, w3, and w1 at
positions 1, 2, and 3 respectively, and thus wins the competition when the user requests webpages w2 or w3. This
means the social planner strategy loses the competition with probability 0.65.
4
General valuation functions: There are situations where the value of the user is not a linear
function of rank. For example, consider a user that only cares about the top search results and
will be satisfied if and only if her requested webpage is ranked higher than a certain threshold. We
investigate the efficiency of minimax strategies for any non-negative non-linear valuation function.
Moreover, we go beyond the ranking duel and consider other dueling games, in the pioneering work
of [19]. While bounding the social welfare for arbitrary valuation functions and general dueling
games seems to be challenging, we present a general principle to capture the main challenge of
this problem. The proposed principle has the same spirit as the classic 0-1 principle in the sorting
network which states: “a sorting network will sort any given input if and only if it sorts any given
0-1 input [13].” The following principle has the same message and shows if one can bound the social
welfare for any 0-1 valuation function, the same bound holds for any arbitrary valuation function.
This means the main challenge for bounding the social welfare is to bound it for 0-1 valuation
functions. The main idea for proving Theorem 3 is to decompose any valuation function into 0-1
valuation functions.
Theorem 3 0-1 Principle: Consider a dueling game. If the price of competition is greater than
α when the social welfare is defined based on any 0-1 valuation function, then it is greater than α
when the social welfare is defined based on any valuation function.
One can leverage this principle to analyze the efficiency of competition in any dueling game. For
example, we show that the price of competition in the ranking duel is at least 0.25 for an arbitrary
valuation function.
Theorem 4 The price of competition is at least 0.25 for the ranking duel, when the social welfare
is defined based on an arbitrary valuation function.
In the proof of Theorem 4, based on the 0-1 principle, we first consider the problem with
pseudo-valuation functions in which the value of each position is either 0 or 1. We consider x∗
as the minimax strategy with the least social welfare and construct a response strategy x′i for the
second player for every 1 ≤ i ≤ n as follows:
Draw a permutation randomly based on strategy x∗. If the value of the position of the i-th
webpage is 1 then play that permutation. Otherwise, swap the position of the i-th webpage
with one of the positions with value 1 at random and play the new permutation.
Next, we use the fact that minimax strategy x∗ does not lose to strategy x′i for proving a set of
inequalities which later on helps us to bound the price of competition. Finally, we use the 0-1
principle to show that this lower bound holds for all possible valuation functions.
This principle also helps us to provide upper bounds on the price of competition when one
considers a general valuation function. For example we show that the PoC of the following two
games introduced by Immorlica et al. [19] cannot be bounded by any constant value:
• Binary search duel: The binary search duel is a dueling game where each player chooses a
binary search tree over the set of all possible requests Ω. When the user’s request ω ∈ Ω
is realized, the value for each strategy is defined based on the depth of request ω in the
corresponding binary search tree.
• Compression duel: The compression duel is a dueling game where each player chooses a binary
tree over the set of all possible requests Ω, i.e., the set of all leaves of the binary tree would
be equal to the set of all possible requests. When the user’s request ω ∈ Ω is realized, the
value for each strategy is defined based on the depth of request ω in the corresponding binary
tree.
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Theorem 5 The price of competition is O( 1|Ω|) for the binary search duel and unbounded for the
compression duel, when the social welfare is defined based on an arbitrary valuation function.
In order to construct bad instances for these duels, we design a valuation function which is 1 for low
depths, 0 for high depths, and a small positive value ǫ in between. We show the price of competition
is less than any given number β > 0 for the binary search duel by constructing an instance of the
binary search duel with |Ω| = Θ( 1
β
). However, we present an instance of the compression duel with
a constant size set Ω and a price of competition less than any given value β > 0.
1.2 Related work
Immorlica et al. [19] are the first who considered the concept of dueling games. They present dueling
games in the context of dueling algorithms, where two competitive algorithms try to maximize the
probability of outperforming their opponent for an unknown stochastic input. While we employ the
same model in this paper, our goal completely differs from that of Immorlica et al. [19]. Immorlica
et al. [19] present polynomial-time algorithm for finding a minimax strategy of a dueling game when
the polytope of minimax strategies can be represented by a polynomial number of linear constraints.
Knowing the fact that the polytope of minimax strategies of any ranking duel has polynomially
many facets, they propose a polynomial-time algorithm for finding a minimax strategy of ranking
duels. This method was later generalized by [3] to solve the Colonel Blotto game. Immorlica et al.
[19] leave the problem of analyzing the social welfare of competitive algorithms as their main open
question. In this paper, we do not deal with the computational complexity of finding minimax
strategies, but we focus on answering the posted open question and analyze the social welfare of
minimax strategies for a given duel.
As we are interested in quantifying the inefficiency of Nash equilibria, our proposed concept of
the price of competition has the same flavor as the concept of the price of anarchy [23, 26]. The
price of anarchy is commonly used for quantifying the inefficiency of a system which is constructed
by selfish agents. For example, it has been used to analyze the inefficiency of Nash equilibria in
congestion games [27, 12], network creation games [16, 14, 4, 5], and selfish scheduling games [6, 20].
(See, e.g. [26] for more examples).
Kempe and Lucier [21] recently study the impact of competition on the social welfare in a
competitive sponsored search market. In their model, which is a departure from the model of
Immorlica et al. [19], search engines again compete to obtain more users. A user’s request is
defined by a set S of webpages which is unknown to search engines, and the user is satisfied if and
only if at least one of webpages in S is ranked in a better position than a given threshold t. The
strategy of each search engine is an ordering over all possible webpages. At last, the user chooses
a search engine based on a selection rule which is a function of probability of being satisfied by
each search engine. Kempe and Lucier [21] prove that if search engines extract utility from satisfied
users or the search engine selection rule is convex, then the social welfare of the game is at least half
of the optimum social welfare. Moreover, they show if the utility of search engines is driven from
all customers and the search engine selection rule is concave, then the social welfare of the game
is bounded away from that of the optimum solution by a factor of Ω(n), where n is the number of
all possible webpages. We would like to note that our model is a general model for studying all
dueling games which is exactly the same as the model of Immorlica et al. [19], and is significantly
different from that of Kempe and Lucier [21].
There is a line of research that study a competition between advertisers in sponsored search
auctions [1, 9, 17, 15, 22]. These works analyze the revenue of a single search engine in various
settings regarding users’ behavior and the business model of advertisers. However, in ranking duel
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we investigate a competition between players who provide orderings rather than advertisers.
There is a rich literature in economics that explains product differentiation in competitive
markets. While producing similar products is supported by classical models such as the Hotelling
model [18], Aspremont, Gabszewicz, and Thisse [8] argue that competitive producers may improve
their revenue by producing different products. See, e.g., [29, 25, 24] for details on this literature.
The same phenomenon can be seen in the sponsored search market, e.g., Telang, Rajan, and
Mukhopadhyay [28] show low-quality search engines may extract revenue from the sponsored search
market.
2 Model
2.1 Dueling games
In dueling game G both players try to beat the other player and offer a better value in the com-
petition. Assume players A and B play pure strategies sA and sB respectively, and event ω has
occurred. In this situation, player A wins the competition if and only if vω(sA) > vω(sB), and thus
the utility of player A given event ω can be written as follows:
uAω (sA, sB) =


+1 if vω(sA) > vω(sB)
0 if vω(sA) = vω(sB)
−1 if vω(sA) < vω(sB)
Now consider a situation where players A and B play mixed strategies x and y respectively and
event ω has occurred. The utility of player A is the probability that player A wins the competition
minus the probability that player B wins the competition and can be defined as follows:
uAω (x,y) = PrsA∼x
sB∼y
[vω(sA) > vω(sB)]− PrsA∼x
sB∼y
[vω(sA) < vω(sB)]
Finally the overall utility of player A is uA(x,y) =
∑
ω pωu
A
ω (x,y). Since dueling game G is
a zero-sum game the utility of player B is the negation of the utility of player A for each ω, i.e.,
uBω (x,y) = −u
A
ω (x,y) and thus u
B(x,y) = −uA(x,y).
Definition 2.1 Minimax strategy: Strategy x of player A is minimax if x ∈
argmax
x′{miny{u
A(x′,y)}}. Similarly, Strategy y of player B is minimax if y ∈
argmax
y′{minx{u
B(x,y′)}}.
Based on the definition of dueling games and the fact that the set of all possible pure strategies
for both players is S, we can conclude the outcome of both players in any Nash equilibrium is 0
and moreover the set of minimax strategies of both players coincide. We define the set of minimax
strategies by M.
Definition 2.2 Social welfare: Consider dueling game G = (Ω, p, S, v). The social welfare of
pure strategy s is the expected value of this strategy over all possible events and can be written as
SW(s) =
∑
ω pωvω(s). The social welfare of mixed strategy x is SW(x) = Es∼x[SW(s)].
In this paper, we are interested to study the social welfare of the game in equilibria. Note that
the customer locks into one of the players in long term. On the other hand, both players only try
to offer the customer a better option than the other one, and thus play a minimax strategy in the
competition. These cause inefficiency in the game. Here we define a new criterion to measure this
inefficiency in the game.
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Definition 2.3 Price of competition: The price of competition is the ratio of the worst minimax
strategy to the optimal solution which is:
minx∈M SW(x)
maxx SW(x)
=
minx∈M SW(x)
maxs∈S SW(s)
.
Similar to the welfare maximization model, we consider the cost minimization model in which
players try to beat the opponent by offering a lower cost to the user. In particular we have a cost
function c, such that cω(s) denotes the cost of strategy s and event ω. Hence, the utility of player
A would be defined as
uAω (x,y) = PrsA∼x
sB∼y
[cω(sA) < cω(sB)]− PrsA∼x
sB∼y
[cω(sA) > cω(sB)].
Similarly we define the social cost SC(s) =
∑
ω pωcω(s) for a pure strategy s and SC(x) =
Es∼x[SC(s)] for a mixed strategy x. Finally the price of competition in cost minimization ver-
sion is defined as
maxx∈M SC(x)
minx SC(x)
=
maxx∈M SC(x)
mins∈S SC(s)
.
2.2 Ranking duel
Ranking duel is a dueling game where Ω = {1, · · · , n} is the set of n webpages which can be
requested by a user. In this game, the set of pure strategies S is equal to the set of all possible
permutations over Ω, i.e., each player outputs an ordering of webpages for the user. We denote
each pure strategy of the ranking duel by π (instead of s) where π(ω) is the rank of webpage ω. The
valuation function v of a raking duel can be defined based on function f : {1, · · · , n} → R+∪{0} as
vω(π) = f(π(ω)). Consider mixed strategy x where xπ is the probability that strategy x outputs
permutation π. The social welfare of strategy x can be defined as:
SW(x) =
∑
ω
∑
π
pωxπf(π(ω)). (1)
3 Price of competition in the linear ranking duel
3.1 Welfare maximization ranking duel
In this section we give bounds for the PoC in the ranking duel when the valuation function is
non-negative and linear, in other words f(i) = c(n − i) + d, where c, d ≥ 0.
First we formulate the social welfare of strategy x and the optimal social welfare. Without
loss of generality in this section we assume p1 ≥ p2 ≥ . . . ≥ pn. Let Prπ∼x[π(a) = i] denote the
probability that in a randomly drawn permutation π from strategy x, the rank of webpage a is i.
Similarly let Prπ∼x[π(a) < π(b)] denote the probability that in a randomly drawn permutation π
from strategy x, webpage a comes before webpage b.
Proposition 3.1 In a ranking duel with valuation function f and n webpages, the social welfare
of a strategy x is SWf (x) =
∑n
a=1
∑n
i=1 paPrπ∼x[π(a) = i]f(i).
Proof. For any page a and position i we compute the probability that a is chosen and it is located
at position i times f(i). Hence,
SW(x) =
n∑
a=1
n∑
i=1
paPrπ∼x[π(a) = i]f(i)
8
Let OPT be the strategy with the maximum social welfare. Hence SW(OPT) is formulated as
follows.
Proposition 3.2 In a ranking duel with valuation function f and n webpages, the optimal social
welfare is SWf (OPT) =
∑n
a=1 paf(a).
Proof. The optimal strategy is to sort the pages by descending order of their probability, therefore
SWf (OPT) is equal to the social welfare of permutation π = 〈1, 2, . . . , n〉. Thus,
SWf (OPT) =
n∑
a=1
paf(a).

Lemma 3.3 shows that for any minimax strategy x and any linear function f(i) = c(n− i) + d
with c, d ≥ 0, the PoC is no less than the case in which f(i) = n− i.
Lemma 3.3 For valuation functions f(i) = n − i, f ′(i) = c(n − i) + d with c, d ≥ 0, and any
strategy x,
SWf (x)
SWf (OPT)
≤
SWf ′(x)
SWf ′(OPT)
.
Proof. By Propositions 3.1 and 3.2, we have
SWf (x)
SWf (OPT)
=
∑n
a=1
∑n
i=1 paPrπ∼x[π(a) = i](n − i)∑n
a=1 pa(n− a)
By multiplying the sides by c
=
∑n
a=1
∑n
i=1 paPrπ∼x[π(a) = i]c(n − i)∑n
a=1 pac(n− a)
Since the fraction is less than 1
≤
d+
∑n
a=1
∑n
i=1 paPrπ∼x[π(a) = i]c(n − i)
d+
∑n
a=1 pac(n − a)
Since
n∑
i=1
paPrπ∼x[π(a) = i] =
n∑
a=1
pa = 1
=
∑n
a=1
∑n
i=1 paPrπ∼x[π(a) = i](c(n − i) + d)∑n
a=1 pa(c(n − a) + d)
=
SWf ′(x)
SWf ′(OPT)
.

Thus any lower bound for the PoC with f(i) = n− i, is also a lower bound for the PoC with any
other linear valuation function. Therefore, from now on we assume f(i) = n−i, and use SW(x) and
SW(OPT) instead of SWf (x) and SWf (OPT), respectively. Hence SW(OPT) =
∑n
a=1 pa(n− a).
Now we try to compute SW(x) from a different perspective.
Proposition 3.4 In a ranking duel with n webpages, the social welfare of strategy x is
SW(x) =
n∑
a=1
n∑
b=a+1
paPrπ∼x[π(a) < π(b)] + pbPrπ∼x[π(b) < π(a)].
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Proof. By Proposition 3.1,
SW(x) =
n∑
a=1
n∑
i=1
paPrπ∼x[π(a) = i](n − i)
=
n∑
a=1
pa
n∑
i=1
Prπ∼x[π(a) = i](n − i) for each page a at position i in π,
consider (n− i) pages at higher positions
=
n∑
a=1
pa
n∑
b=1
Prπ∼x[π(a) < π(b)] by considering each pair of pages a and b once
=
n∑
a=1
n∑
b=a+1
paPrπ∼x[π(a) < π(b)] + pbPrπ∼x[π(b) < π(a)].

Intuitively by Proposition 3.4 we can compute the social welfare of a strategy by comparing
the ranks of every pairs of webpages. Therefore we define hab(x) to be the amount that the pair
of webpages a and b adds to the social welfare in strategy x, i.e. hab(x) = paPrπ∼x[π(a) < π(b)] +
pbPrπ∼x[π(b) < π(a)]. Thus we can rewrite Proposition 3.4 as SW(x) =
∑n
a=1
∑n
b=a+1 hab(x).
Hence for every strategy x,
SW(x)
SW(OPT)
=
∑n
a=1
∑n
b=a+1 hab(x)∑n
a=1 pa(n− a)
.
In Lemma 3.6 we provide our main tool for bounding the price of competition in the linear ranking
duel.
For proving Lemma 3.6, first we need to prove the following lemma.
Lemma 3.5 For any three integer numbers n, a, and k such that 1 ≤ a ≤ n − 1 and 2 ≤ k ≤ n,
we have
k−1∑
i=0
(
a− 1
i
)(
n− a
k − i− 1
)
(k − i− 1) = (n − a)
(
n− 2
k − 2
)
(2)
Proof. We use double counting. Consider a problem in which we have n balls numbered from 1
to n and our goal is to color the balls such that
• We have k − 2 black balls, 1 red ball, and n− (k − 2)− 1 uncolored balls.
• a-th ball is uncolored.
• Index of the red ball is higher than a.
We calculate the number of different ways that we can color the balls. One way to calculate this is
to select k − 1 balls to color first, and then color k − 2 of them with black and one of them which
has an index higher than a with red. The number of such colorings can be calculated as follows
k−1∑
i=0
(
a− 1
i
)(
n− a
k − i− 1
)
(k − i− 1),
which is equal to the left side of Equation (3.5). The other way to count the number of valid
colorings is to first color one ball with rank higher than a with red, and then color k − 2 balls out
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of all balls except the a-th and the red ball. We have n − a choices for coloring the red ball and(
n−2
k−2
)
choices for coloring the black ones. Thus we have (n− a)
(
n−2
k−2
)
different ways, which is equal
to the right side of Equation (3.5). Therefore, both sides of Equation (3.5) are equal the number
of different valid colorings. 
Lemma 3.6 Given a strategy x, if there exist an integer k such that 2 ≤ k ≤ n and for all k
different indices i1 < i2 < . . . < ik, ∑k
a=1
∑k
b=a+1 hiaib(x)∑k
a=1 pia(k − a)
≥ α,
then SW(x)
SW(OPT) ≥ α.
Proof. We compute the summation of
k∑
a=1
k∑
b=a+1
piaPrπ∼x[π(ia) < π(ib)] + pibPrπ∼x[π(ib) < π(ia)] ≥ α(
k∑
a=1
pia(k − a))
for all
(
n
k
)
possible indices 1 ≤ i1 < . . . < ik ≤ n, therefore we have:
∑
1≤i1<...<ik≤n
k∑
a=1
k∑
b=a+1
piaPrπ∼x[π(ia) < π(ib)] + pibPrπ∼x[π(ib) < π(ia)] ≥ (3)
α(
∑
1≤i1<...<ik≤n
k∑
a=1
pia(k − a))
For each 1 ≤ a < b ≤ k, Prπ∼x[π(ia) < π(ib)] + pibPrπ∼x[π(ib) < π(ia)] appears
(
n−2
k−2
)
times in the
left side, hence
∑
1≤i1<i2<i3<...<ik≤n
k∑
a=1
k∑
b=a+1
piaPrπ∼x[π(ia) < π(ib)] + pibPrπ∼x[π(ib) < π(ia)]
=
n∑
a=1
n∑
b=a+1
(
n− 2
k − 2
)
(paPrπ∼x[π(a) < π(b)] + pbPrπ∼x[π(b) < π(a)]).
Moreover, the coefficient of pa in the right side of Equation (3) is equal to
∑k−2
b=0
(
a−1
b
)(
n−a
k−1−b
)
(k−b),
Therefore
n∑
a=1
n∑
b=a+1
(
n− 2
k − 2
)
(paPrπ∼x[π(a) < π(b)] + pbPrπ∼x[π(b) < π(a)]) ≥
α(
n∑
a=1
pa
k−2∑
b=0
(
a− 1
b
)(
n− a
k − 1− b
)
(k − b))
Lemma 3.5 states that the right side is equal to α(
∑n
a=1 pa(n − a)
(
n−2
k−2
)
). Thus, by dividing both
sides by
(
n−2
k−2
)
we have
n∑
a=1
n∑
b=a+1
paPrπ∼x[π(a) < π(b)] + pbPrπ∼x[π(b) < π(a)] ≥ α(
n∑
a=1
pa(n− a))
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which concludes SW(x)SW(OPT) ≥ α. 
Now our goal is to provide a lower bound for α when x is a minimax strategy. In order to
do that, first we provide some structural properties of the minimax strategies. Leveraging these
properties we write a mathematical program with k variables pa and
(
k
2
)
variables hab. Finally, we
provide a factor-revealing linear program to obtain a close lower bound for α in the corresponding
mathematical program.
In Lemmas 3.7, 3.8, 3.10, and Proposition 3.9 we provide the structural properties of the
minimax strategies.
Lemma 3.7 Let x be a minimax strategy and a and b be two webpages such that pa ≥ pb. Let πba
be any permutation in the support of x in which b precedes a. Let i < j be the respective position
of a and b in πba, then strategy x must satisfy,
Prπ∼x[i < π(b) ≤ j] + Prπ∼x[i ≤ π(b) < j] ≥
pa
pb
(Prπ∼x[i < π(a) ≤ j] + Prπ∼x[i ≤ π(a) < j]).
Proof. Let πab be a permutation which is constructed from πba by swapping a and b. This means
πab(a) = i and πab(b) = j. Consider strategy x
′ = x + ǫπab − ǫπba which is produced from x by
increasing the probability of πab by ǫ and decreasing the probability of πba by ǫ. Since x is a minmax
strategy, we have uA(x,x′) ≥ 0.
As mentioned in Section 2.1, uAw(x,x
′) =
∑
ω u
A
ω (x,x
′), where uAω (x,x
′) is the payoff of the
game when webpage ω is searched.
u(x,x′) =
n∑
ω=1
pωu
A
ω (x,x
′) (4)
Since, both players act the same for all pages except a and b, we have
∀1 ≤ ω ≤ n, ω 6= a, ω 6= b uAω (x,x
′) = 0. (5)
Therefore
uA(x,x′) = pau
A
a (x,x
′) + pbu
A
b (x,x
′). (6)
Let x′′ be a new strategy such that x′′πba = xπba − ǫ, and for every other permutation π,
x′′π =
1
1−ǫxπ. In fact strategy x plays strategy x
′′ with probability 1− ǫ and plays permutation πba
with probability ǫ. Also strategy x′ plays x′′ with probability 1− ǫ and plays permutation πab with
probability ǫ. Therefore we can compute uAa (x,x
′) as follows
uAa (x,x
′) = (1− ǫ)2(Prπ1∼x′′,π2∼x′′ [π1(a) < π2(a)]− Prπ1∼x′′,π2∼x′′ [π1(a) > π2(a)])
The case that both strategies play x′′
+ ǫ(1− ǫ)(Prπ2∼x′′ [πba(a) < π2(a)] − Prπ2∼x′′ [πba(a) > π2(a)])
The case that x plays πba and x
′ plays x′′
+ ǫ(1− ǫ)(Prπ1∼x′′ [π1(a) < πab(a)] − Prπ1∼x′′ [π1(a) > πab(a)])
The case that x plays x′′ and x′ plays πab
+ ǫ2(Pr[πba(a) < πab(a)]− Pr[πba(a) > πab(a)])
The case that x plays πba and x
′ plays πab
Consider the first term of the above equation. Since both permutations π1 and π2 are drawn from
the same distribution x′′, this term is zero. On the other hand, recall that πab(a) = πba(b) = i and
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πab(b) = πba(a) = j. Thus Pr[πba(a) < πab(a)]−Pr[πba(a) > πab(a)] = Pr[j < i]−Pr[j > i] = −1,
hence
uAa (x,x
′) = ǫ(1− ǫ)(Prπ2∼x′′ [j < π2(a)]− Prπ2∼x′′ [j > π2(a)]) (7)
+ ǫ(1− ǫ)(Prπ1∼x′′ [π1(a) < i]− Prπ1∼x′′ [π1(a) > i])
− ǫ2
Similarly we have
uAb (x,x
′) = ǫ(1− ǫ)(Prπ2∼x′′ [i < π2(b)]− Prπ2∼x′′ [i > π2(b)]) (8)
+ ǫ(1− ǫ)(Prπ1∼x′′ [π1(b) < j]− Prπ1∼x′′ [π1(b) > j])
+ ǫ2
uA(x,x′) ≥ 0 thus by Equation (6) pau
A
a (x,x
′) + pbu
A
b (x,x
′) ≥ 0 . Hence using Equations (7) and
(8) we have
paǫ(1− ǫ)(Prπ2∼x′′ [j < π2(a)]− Prπ2∼x′′ [j > π2(a)])
+ paǫ(1− ǫ)(Prπ1∼x′′ [π1(a) < i]− Prπ1∼x′′ [π1(a) > i])− paǫ
2
+ pbǫ(1− ǫ)(Prπ2∼x′′ [i < π2(b)]− Prπ2∼x′′ [i > π2(b)])
+ pbǫ(1− ǫ)(Prπ1∼x′′ [π1(b) < j] − Prπ1∼x′′ [π1(b) > j]) + pbǫ
2 ≥ 0
Note that pa ≥ pb which means −paǫ
2 + pbǫ
2 ≤ 0. Thus we conclude:
pa(Prπ2∼x′′ [j < π2(a)] − Prπ2∼x′′ [j > π2(a)])
+pa(Prπ1∼x′′ [π1(a) < i] − Prπ1∼x′′ [π1(a) > i])
+pb(Prπ2∼x′′ [i < π2(b)] − Prπ2∼x′′ [i > π2(b)])
+pb(Prπ1∼x′′ [π1(b) < j] − Prπ1∼x′′ [π1(b) > j]) ≥ 0 (9)
Note that as ǫ approaches zero, strategy x′′ approaches x. Hence, we write Equation (9) as follows:
pa(Prπ∼x[j < π(a)] − Prπ∼x[j > π(a)])
+pa(Prπ∼x[π(a) < i] − Prπ∼x[π(a) > i])
+pb(Prπ∼x[i < π(b)] − Prπ∼x[i > π(b)])
+pb(Prπ∼x[π(b) < j] − Prπ∼x[π(b) > j]) ≥ 0 (10)
Rearranging the terms we have
Prπ∼x[i < π(b) ≤ j] + Prπ∼x[i ≤ π(b) < j] ≥
pa
pb
(Prπ∼x[i < π(a) ≤ j] + Prπ∼x[i ≤ π(a) < j]).

Intuitively Lemma 3.7 shows that if pa ≥ pb and there is a permutation in which b comes before
a, then the probability that x ranks b in interval [i, j] (counting the non-endpoint elements twice)
is greater than the probability that x ranks a in this interval by a factor of pa
pb
. Otherwise, by
swapping the rank of a and b we can achieve a strategy that beats x.
Lemma 3.8 Let x be a minimax strategy and xπ be the probability that strategy x plays permutation
π. For every pair of webpages a and b with pa ≥ pb, we have
Prπ∼x[π(a) < π(b)] ≥ (
pa
2pb
− 1)Prπ∼x[π(b) < π(a)]. (11)
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Proof. First we find the set Π using Algorithm 1. Let Nab be the set of all strategies in x in
which a comes before b. Similarly let Nba be the set of strategies in x in which b comes before a.
In Algorithm 1, initially we consider a set S∗ to be Nba. Then, at each step we add permutation
π ∈ S∗ with the rightmost a to Π, and remove all permutations π′ such that the interval [π′(b), π′(a)]
overlaps the interval [π(b), π(a)] from S∗. We repeat this process until all permutations are removed
from S∗.
Algorithm 1
input: x, a, b
1: S∗ ← Nba.
2: Π← ∅.
3: while S∗ 6= ∅ do
4: Let π ∈ S∗ be the permutation with the rightmost π(a) among all permutations in S∗.
5: Π← Π ∪ {π}.
6: S∗ ← {π′ ∈ S∗|[π′(b), π′(a)] ∩ [π(b), π(a)] = ∅}.
7: end while
8: return Π
Afterwards for each π ∈ Π, we apply Lemma 3.7 and add all these inequalities to reach the
following inequality:∑
π∈Π
Prπ′∼x[π(b) < π
′(b) ≤ π(a)] + Prπ′∼x[π(b) ≤ π
′(b) < π(a)]
≥
∑
π∈Π
pa
pb
(Prπ′∼x[π(b) < π
′(a) ≤ π(a)] + Prπ′∼x[π(b) ≤ π
′(a) < π(b)]). (12)
We can partition each term of Inequality (12) into two terms such that in one of them π′(a) > π′(b)
and in the other one π′(b) > π′(a). Thus we can rewrite Inequality (12) as follows∑
π∈Π
Prπ′∼x[π
′(a) < π′(b) ∧ π(b) < π′(b) ≤ π(a)] (13)
+Prπ′∼x[π
′(b) < π′(a) ∧ π(b) < π′(b) ≤ π(a)]
+Prπ′∼x[π
′(a) < π′(b) ∧ π(b) ≤ π′(b) < π(a)]
+Prπ′∼x[π
′(b) < π′(a) ∧ π(b) ≤ π′(b) < π(a)]
≥
pa
pb
∑
π∈Π
Prπ′∼x[π
′(a) < π′(b) ∧ π(b) < π′(a) ≤ π(a)]
+Prπ′∼x[π
′(b) < π′(a) ∧ π(b) < π′(a) ≤ π(a)]
+Prπ′∼x[π
′(a) < π′(b) ∧ π(b) ≤ π′(a) < π(b)]
+Prπ′∼x[π
′(a) < π′(b) ∧ π(b) ≤ π′(a) < π(b)].
Now for the sake of convenience, for webpage c ∈ {a, b}, we define Rabc and R
ba
c as follows.
Rabc =
∑
π∈Π
Prπ′∼x[π
′(a) < π′(b)∧π(b) < π′(c) ≤ π(a)]+Prπ′∼x[π
′(a) < π′(b)∧π(b) ≤ π′(c) < π(a)].
Rbac =
∑
π∈Π
Prπ′∼x[π
′(b) < π′(a)∧π(b) < π′(c) ≤ π(a)]+Prπ′∼x[π
′(b) < π′(a)∧π(b) ≤ π′(c) < π(a)].
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Thus we can rewrite Inequality (13) based on the above definitions, and conclude
Rabb +R
ba
b ≥
pa
pb
(Raba +R
ba
a ). (14)
Note that by the definition of R, for each permutation π′ ∈ Π a randomly drawn permutation π′
from x and a webpage c ∈ {a, b}, we add 2 to Rc if π
′(c) is between the rank of a and b in π, and
we add 1 if π′(c) is equal to the rank of either a or b in π. More formally we define rc(π, π
′) as
follows
rc(π
′, π) =


2 if π(a) < π′(c) < π(b) or π(b) < π′(c) < π(a)
1 if π′(c) = π(a) or π′(c) = π(b)
0 if otherwise
Thus we can write Rabc and R
ba
c as follows
Rabc =
∑
π∈Π
∑
π′∈Nab
xπ′rc(π
′, π). (15)
Rbac =
∑
π∈Π
∑
π′∈Nba
xπ′rc(π
′, π).
Regarding the construction of Π, for any rank i, there is at most one permutation π ∈ Π such that
i is between π(a) and π(b). Thus for a permutation π′, there is at most one permutation π ∈ Π
such that rb(π
′, π) is non-zero. Moreover rb(π
′, π) ≤ 2. Thus for any permutation π we have∑
π∈Π
rb(π
′, π) ≤ 2. (16)
As a result by Equation (15) and Inequality (16), we have
Rbab =
∑
π′∈Nba
∑
π∈Π
xπ′rb(π
′, π) ≤
∑
π′∈Nba
2xπ′ (17)
Rabb =
∑
π′∈Nab
∑
π∈Π
xπ′rb(π
′, π) ≤
∑
π′∈Nab
2xπ′ (18)
On the other hand for every rank i if there is a permutation π′ ∈ Nba with π
′(a) = i, then there is
exactly one permutation π ∈ Π such that i ∈ [π(b), π(a)] and hence ra(π
′, π) ≥ 1. Thus,
Rbaa =
∑
π′∈Nba
∑
π∈Π
xπ′ra(π
′, π) ≥
∑
π′∈Nba
xπ′ (19)
By Inequalities (17) and (19) we have
Rbab ≤ 2R
ba
a (20)
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Now we can prove the lemma. By Equation (14),
Rabb +R
ba
b ≥
pa
pb
(Raba +R
ba
a ) Since R
ab
a ≥ 0
Rabb +R
ba
b ≥
pa
pb
Rbaa By Inequality (20)
Rabb + 2R
ba
a ≥
pa
pb
Rbaa
Rabb ≥ (
pa
pb
− 2)Rbaa By Inequality (18)∑
π′∈Nab
2xπ′ ≥ (
pa
pb
− 2)Rbaa By Inequality (19)
∑
π′∈Nab
2xπ′ ≥ (
pa
pb
− 2)
∑
π′∈Nba
xπ′
Since
∑
π′∈Nab
xπ′ = Prπ∼x[π(a) < π(b)] and
∑
π′∈Nba
xπ′ = Prπ∼x[π(b) < π(a)],
Prπ∼x[π(a) < π(b)] ≥ (
pa
2pb
− 1)Prπ∼x[π(b) < π(a)].

Briefly, in the proof of Lemma 3.8 we propose an algorithm to find a set of permutations Π in
x, such that 1) for each π ∈ Π, b comes before a, 2) for each permutation π′ in x in which b comes
before a, there is a permutation π ∈ Π, such that π(b) ≤ π′(a) ≤ π(a), and 3) the interval of the
ranks of b and a are distinct, i.e. for two permutations π, π′ ∈ Π, [π(b), π(a)] ∩ [π′(b), π′(a)] = ∅.
We apply the inequality in Lemma 3.7 for all permutations in Π to achieve Lemma 3.8.
In Proposition 3.9 and Lemma 3.10 we provide lower bounds for hab(x) when x is a minimax
strategy. Hence we can use these lower bounds in the proposed mathematical program to achieve
a lower bound for the PoC.
Proposition 3.9 For minimax strategy x and webpages a and b such that pa ≥ pb, hab(x) ≥ pb.
Proof. Since pa ≥ pb and Prπ∼x[π(a) < π(b)] + Prπ∼x[π(b) < π(a)] = 1, we have:
paPrπ∼x[π(a) < π(b)] + pbPrπ∼x[π(b) < π(a)] ≥ pbPrπ∼x[π(a) < π(b)] + pbPrπ∼x[π(b) < π(a)]
= pb

Lemma 3.10 For minimax strategy x and webpages a and b such that pa ≥ pb, hab(x) ≥ pa−2pb+
2p2
b
pa
.
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Proof. First we claim that Prπ∼x[π(a) < π(b)] ≥ 1−
2pb
pa
. By Lemma 3.8,
Prπ∼x[π(a) < π(b)] ≥ (
pa
2pb
− 1)Prπ∼x[π(b) < π(a)] dividing the sides by Prπ∼x[π(b) < π(a)]
⇒
Prπ∼x[π(a) < π(b)]
Prπ∼x[π(b) < π(a)]
≥ (
pa
2pb
− 1)
⇒
1
Prπ∼x[π(b) < π(a)]
≥
pa
2pb
⇒ Prπ∼x[π(b) < π(a)] ≤
2pb
pa
since Prπ∼x[π(b) < π(a)] = 1− Prπ∼x[π(a) < π(b)]
⇒ Prπ∼x[π(a) < π(b)] ≥ 1−
2pb
pa
(21)
Now we use Inequality (21) and the fact that pa ≥ pb as follows
paPrπ∼x[π(a) < π(b)] + pbPrπ∼x[π(b) < π(a)]
= paPrπ∼x[π(a) < π(b)] + pb(1− Prπ∼x[π(a) < π(b)])
= pb + (pa − pb)Prπ∼x[π(a) < π(b)] By Inequality (21)
≥ pb + (pa − pb)(1−
2pb
pa
) = pa − 2pb +
2p2b
pa

Leveraging the properties of the minimax strategies we write MP 22. In MP 22, Constraints
24 and 25 force pa’s to satisfy the probability constraints. Using Proposition 3.9, Constraint 26
forces hab to be no less than pb and due to Lemma 3.10, Constraint 26 forces hab to be no less than
pa − 2pb +
2p2
b
pa
. By Lemma 3.6, α in Constraint 23 gives a lower bound for the PoC.
minimize α (22)
subject to α =
∑k
a=1
∑k
b=a+1 hab∑k
a=1 pa(k − a)
(23)
pa ≥ 0 ∀1 ≤ a ≤ k (24)∑
1≤a≤k
pa ≤ 1 (25)
hab ≥ pb ∀1 ≤ a < b ≤ k (26)
hab ≥ pa − 2pb +
2p2b
pa
∀1 ≤ a < b ≤ k (27)
For each k, let αk be the optimal value of the objective function in MP 22.
Lemma 3.11 αk is a lower bound for the PoC of the linear ranking duel where n ≥ k.
Proof. As we have in Lemma 3.6, in a strategy x, if for every k indices i1 < i2 < . . . < ik we have∑k
a=1
∑k
b=a+1 piaPrπ∼x[π(ia) < π(ib)] + pibPrπ∼x[π(ib) < π(ia)]∑k
a=1 pia(k − a)
≥ α,
then SW(x)SW(OPT) ≥ α.
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Now consider k indices which minimizes this fraction and for 1 ≤ ia ≤ k, let pa be the probability
of that webpage and for 1 ≤ ia < ib ≤ k let hab be paPrπ∼x[π(ia) < π(ib)]+pbPrπ∼x[π(ib) < π(ia)].
Constraint 24 forces the probabilities to be positive and Constraint 25 forces the sum of probabilities
to be less than 1. Since we are considering minmax strategies, we use Proposition 3.9 and Lemma
3.10 to give lower bounds in Constraints 26 and 27 for hab. Therefore any minmax strategy in a
ranking duel is a feasible solution for MP 22. Thus α is a lower bound for the PoC. 
In Theorem 3.13 we formally prove α10 ≥ 0.612, which results in PoC ≥ 0.612 for any ranking
duel with n ≥ 10 webpages. Moreover, we write a computer program to find αk for 2 ≤ k ≤ 100
(see Figure 1).
In order to prove Theorem 3.13, first we should prove the following lemma.
Lemma 3.12 For 0 ≤ pb ≤ pa ≤ 1, max{pb, pa−2pb+
2p2
b
)
p1 } ≥ max{pb, pa−2pb,
(pa−pb)
1.208 ,
(2pa−∗pb)
3.2 }.
Proof. If pb = 0 the inequality holds, thus we assume pb > 0. Let z =
pa
pb
. We multiply each side
by 1
pb
. Thus we should prove
max{
1
pb
pb,
1
pb
(pa − 2pb) +
1
pb
2p2b
pa
} ≥ max{
1
pb
pb,
1
pb
(pa − 2pb),
1
pb
pa − pb
1.208
,
1
pb
2pa − pb
3.2
}
⇒max{1, z − 2 +
2
z
} ≥ max{1, z − 2,
z − 1
1.208
,
2z − 1
3.2
}
z − 2 + 2
z
≥ z − 2, thus it is sufficient to prove z − 2 + 2
z
≥ z−11.208 and z − 2 +
2
z
≥ 2z−13.2 . Since
(2× 1.208− 1)2 − 8(1.208− 1)× 1.208 > 0, (1.208− 1)z2 − z(2× 1.208− 1) + 2× 1.208 > 0. Thus
by dividing the terms by 1.208z we have
z − 2 +
2
z
−
z − 1
1.208
> 0
⇒z − 2 +
2
z
>
z − 1
1.208
.
Moreover, since (2× 3.2− 1)2− 8(3.2− 2)× 3.2 > 0, (3.2− 2)z3.2− z(2× 3.2− 1) + 2× 3.2 > 0.
Thus by dividing the terms by 3.2z we have
z − 2 +
2
z
−
2z − 1
3.2
> 0
⇒z − 2 +
2
z
>
2z − 1
3.2
.

Theorem 3.13 For a linear ranking duel with n ≥ 10 webpages, PoC ≥ 0.612.
Proof. First we try to replace Constraint 27 with some linear constraints. More precisely we
replace max{pb, pa − 2pb +
2p2
b
)
p1 } by the maximum of four linear terms. Lemma 3.12 shows we can
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change the MP 22 to achieve the following program.
minimize α (28)
subject to α =
∑k
a=1
∑k
b=a+1 hab∑k
a=1 pa(k − a)
(29)
pa ≥ 0 ∀1 ≤ a ≤ k (30)∑
1≤a≤k
pa ≤ 1 (31)
hab ≥ pb ∀1 ≤ a < b ≤ k (32)
hab ≥ pa − 2pb ∀1 ≤ a < b ≤ k (33)
hab ≥
pa − pb
1.208
∀1 ≤ a < b ≤ k (34)
hab ≥
2pa − pb
3.2
∀1 ≤ a < b ≤ k (35)
Still Constraint 29 is not linear. We scale the probabilities such that
∑k
a=1 pa(k − a) be-
comes equal to 1, hence we can have a linear constraint instead of Constraint 29. Let (α, V =
〈v12, v13, . . . , vk−1k〉, P = 〈p1, p2, . . . , pk〉) be a feasible solution for MP 29. We provide a feasible
solution with variables (α′, V ′ = 〈v′12, v
′
13, . . . , v
′
k−1k〉, P = 〈p
′
1, p
′
2, . . . , p
′
k〉) such that α
′ = α. Let
c = 1∑k
a=1 pa(k−a)
. Let p′i = cpi and h
′
ab = chab. Hence,
α′ =
k∑
a=1
k∑
b=a+1
h′ab
=
k∑
a=1
k∑
b=a+1
chab
=
∑k
a=1
∑k
b=a+1 hab∑k
a=1 pa(k − a)
=α.
Moreover, all Constraints 38, 40, 41, 42, and 43 hold since by dividing the sides of inequality we
achieve the constraints in MP 28. Thus for any feasible solution for MP 28 there is a feasible
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solution for LP 36 with α′ = α.
minimize α′ (36)
subject to α′ =
k∑
a=1
k∑
b=a+1
h′ab (37)
p′a ≥ 0 ∀1 ≤ a ≤ k (38)
k∑
a=1
p′a(k − a) = 1 (39)
h′ab ≥ p
′
b ∀1 ≤ a < b ≤ k (40)
h′ab ≥ p
′
a − 2p
′
b ∀1 ≤ a < b ≤ k (41)
h′ab ≥
p′a − p
′
b
1.208
∀1 ≤ a < b ≤ k (42)
h′ab ≥
2p′a − p
′
b
3.2
∀1 ≤ a < b ≤ k (43)
Now we write the dual program of LP 36. Finding a feasible solution for the dual program, we
provide a lower bound for α. We can set the objective function of LP 36 to the minimization of∑k
a=1
∑k
b=a+1 h
′
ab and remove Constraint 38. Then by assigning variables θ, βi,j, γi,j , λi,j, ρi,j to
Constraints 39, 40, 41, 42, and 43 respectively, the dual LP is as follows
maximize θ (44)
subject to θ(k − a)−
a−1∑
i=1
βi,a (45)
−
k∑
j=a+1
γa,j +
a−1∑
i=1
2γi,a (46)
−
k∑
j=a+1
1
1.208
λa,j +
a−1∑
i=1
1
1.208
λi,a (47)
−
k∑
j=a+1
2
3.2
ρa,j +
a−1∑
i=1
1
3.2
ρi,a ≤ 0 ∀1 ≤ a ≤ k (48)
βa,b + γa,b + λa,b + ρa,b ≤ 1 ∀1 ≤ a < b ≤ k (49)
βa,b, γa,b, λa,b, ρa,b ≥ 0 ∀1 ≤ a < b ≤ k (50)
Table 5 provides a feasible solution for LP 44 with k = 10, in which θ = 0.612. Thus in LP 36,
α′ ≥ 0.61 and therefore PoC ≥ 0.612. 
3.2 Cost minimization ranking duel
In this section we consider the cost minimization version of the ranking duel with linear cost function
and prove a constant upper bound for the PoCcost of this game, using some structural results of
the minimax strategies provided in Section 3.1.
Theorem 3.14 For any instance of the cost minimization ranking duel with linear cost function
PoCcost ≤ 3.
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Figure 1: Lower bound on the solution of MP 22. While we formally prove α10 ≥ 0.612, this
figure shows lower bounds on αk for 2 ≤ k ≤ 100 found by a computer program. Note that, by
Lemma 3.11 the PoC of the ranking duel with linear valuation function is at least αk for all n ≥ k.
Proof. The minimum social cost is
∑n
b=1 pbb, obtained by sorting the webpages accord-
ing to their probabilities. Similar to Proposition 3.4, for every strategy x the social cost is
1 +
∑n
a=1
∑n
b=i+1 paPrπ∼x[π(a) < π(b)] + pbPrπ∼x[π(b) < π(a)]. Thus the price of competition for
a minimax strategy x is
1 +
∑n
a=1
∑n
b=i+1 paPrπ∼x[π(a) < π(b)] + pbPrπ∼x[π(b) < π(a)]∑n
b=1 pbb
. (51)
For every pair of webpages a and b with pa ≥ pb we claim that in a minimax strategy x,
paPrπ∼x[π(a) < π(b)] + pbPrπ∼x[π(b) < π(a)] ≤ 3pb. Note that the polytope of the minimax
strategies does not differ in the welfare maximization and cost minimization model. In other words,
strategy x is a minimax strategy for the cost minimization ranking duel iff it is a minimax strategy
in the welfare maximization ranking duel. Thus Lemma 3.8 also holds in the cost minimization
ranking duel. By Lemma 3.8, ( pa2pb − 1)Prπ∼x[π(a) < π(b)] ≤ Prπ∼x[π(b) < π(a)]. Simplifying
the formula, we have pa2pbPrπ∼x[π(a) < π(b)] ≤ Prπ∼x[π(b) < π(a)] + Prπ∼x[π(a) < π(b)]. Since
Prπ∼x[π(b) < π(a)] + Prπ∼x[π(a) < π(b)] = 1, we have
pa
pb
Prπ∼x[π(a) < π(b)] ≤ 2.
Adding Prπ∼x[π(b) < π(a)] to both hand sides, and then multiplying both hand sides by pb, we
have
paPrπ∼x[π(a) < π(b)] + pbPrπ∼x[π(b) < π(a)] ≤ 2pb + pbPrπ∼x[π(b) < π(a)].
As Prπ∼x[π(b) < π(a)] ≤ 1, we can conclude
paPrπ∼x[π(a) < π(b)] + pbPrπ∼x[π(b) < π(a)] ≤ 3pb. (52)
Now by writing Inequality (52) property for all pairs of webpages a and b we have
n∑
a=1
n∑
b=i+1
paPrπ∼x[π(a) < π(b)] + pbPrπ∼x[π(b) < π(a)] ≤ 3
n∑
b=1
pb(b− 1) = 3(
n∑
b=1
pbb−
n∑
b=1
pb).
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Since
∑n
b=1 pb = 1, by simplifying formula we have
3 +
∑n
a=1
∑n
b=i+1 paPrπ∼x[π(a) < π(b)] + pbPrπ∼x[π(b) < π(a)]∑n
b=1 pbb
≤ 3.
Thus by Equation (51), PoCcost ≤ 3. 
4 General framework
In this section we present a general framework for analyzing the price of competition in dueling
games. Proving lower bounds for the price of competition in dueling games highly depends on the
valuation functions and it becomes more challenging when the valuation functions are complex.
However, the behavior of minimax strategies only depends on the comparison of the valuation
functions rather than actual values. We leverage this fact to provide Theorem 4.1 which enables us
to prove bounds for the price of competition without concerning the complexities of the valuation
functions. We refer to this theorem as the 0-1 principle.
Let (Ω, p, S, v) be a dueling game and α be a non-negative real number. We define the trigger
function vαω(s) for a pure strategy s in the following way:
vαω(s) =
{
1 if vω(s) ≥ α
0 if vω(s) < α
Moreover, we define the pseudo-welfare function SWα(s) as the summation of the values of the trig-
ger functions when a player is playing strategy s with respect to α, SWα(s) =
∑
ω∈Ω pωv
α
ω(s). Fur-
thermore, the pseudo-welfare function for a mixed strategy x is defined as SWα(x) = Es∼x[SW
α(s)].
Let PoCα be the pseudo-welfare of the minimax strategy with the least social welfare over SW(OPT)
which can be formulated by PoCα = SW
α(x∗)
SWα(OPT) , where x
∗ is the minimax strategy with the least
social welfare and OPT is the strategy with highest social welfare. Note that optimal and minimax
strategies are determined regardless of the pseudo-welfare function. For simplicity, we consider
PoCα = 1 when SWα(OPT) = 0. In the following we show that the PoC of every dueling game is
bounded by minα≥0{PoC
α}.
Theorem 4.1 (0-1 principle) For every dueling game we have PoC ≥ minα≥0{PoC
α}.
Proof. Since vαω(s) = 1 if and only if vω(s) ≥ α, and v
α
ω(s) = 0 otherwise, we can formulate vω(s)
as:
vω(s) =
∫ ∞
0
vαω(s) dα. (53)
Therefore, for every strategy x we have:
SW(x) = Es∼x[
∑
ω∈Ω
pωvω(s)]
= Es∼x[
∫ ∞
0
∑
ω∈Ω
pωv
α
ω(s) dα] By Equation (53)
=
∫ ∞
0
Es∼x[SW
α(s)] dα By the definition of SWα(s)
22
=∫ ∞
0
SWα(x) dα.
Let β = minα≥0{PoC
α}. Thus, for every minimax strategy x∗ and α ≥ 0 we have β×SWα(OPT) ≤
SWα(x∗). Hence,
β × SW(OPT) = β ×
∫ ∞
0
SWα(OPT)dα (54)
≤
∫ ∞
0
SWα(x∗) dα = SW(x∗),
which implies PoC ≥ β. 
In the following subsections we show how we can apply the 0-1 principle to dueling games in
order to present lower bounds for the PoC. In Subsection 4.1 we show that the PoC of the ranking
duel is at least 14 regardless of the valuation function. Note that, for every α, one could design a
valuation function in such a way that |vαω(x)−vω(x)| ≤ ǫ while the optimal and minimax strategies
remain the same. Therefore, we have the lowest PoC when the range of the valuation function
is [0, ǫ] ∪ [1, 1 + ǫ]. We use this fact to provide upper bounds for the PoC of binary search and
compression duels in Subsections 4.2 and 4.3.
4.1 Ranking duel with general valuation function
Recall that in the ranking duel each position of the permutation has a valuation f(i), each pure
strategy of the players is a permutation of webpages π = 〈π−1(1), π−1(2), π−1(3), . . . , π−1(n)〉, and
Ω = {1, 2, . . . , n} is the set of elements of uncertainty. For a webpage ω ∈ Ω, vω(π) = f(π(ω)),
where π(ω) is the rank of ω in π. In the following, we use the 0-1 principle to show that the PoC
of the ranking duel with an arbitrary valuation function is at least 14 .
Theorem 4.2 The PoC of the ranking duel is at least 14 .
Proof. To prove this lower bound we first show that PoCα of this game is at least 14 for all α ≥ 0
and then we apply the 0-1 principle and conclude that PoC ≥ 14 . Let α ≥ 0 be a real number
and k be the number of indices i of the permutation such that f(i) ≥ α. Therefore, for each pure
strategy π, vαωi = 1 for exactly k elements ωi and v
α
ωi
= 0 for the other n − k elements. Since
p1 ≥ p2 ≥ . . . ≥ pn,
SWα(OPT) ≤
k∑
i=1
pi. (55)
Also for every pure strategy π, SWα(π) ≤
∑k
i=1 pi. Now let x
∗ be the minimax strategy with
the least social welfare. For each webpage i, let qi be the probability that x
∗ puts webpage i in a
position with valuation at least α. Therefore we can formulate SWα(x∗) as
SWα(x∗) =
n∑
i=1
piqi. (56)
Consider the mixed strategy x′i which draws a random permutation π from x
∗ and plays permutation
T (π) as follows
• If f(π(i)) ≥ α then return π.
• Otherwise, Let w1, w2, . . . , wk be the set of webpages such that f(π(wi)) ≥ α. Choose one of
the webpages in {w1, w2, . . . , wk} uniformly at random and swap the position of that webpage
with the position of webpage i and return the new permutation.
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Note that strategy x′i plays in such a way that f(π(wi)) ≥ α, and thus v
α
ω(x
′
i) = 1. Since x
∗ is
a minimax strategy, the payoff uA(x∗,x′i) should be greater than or equal to 0. This observation,
follows from the fact that in an NE of the game, the payoff of both players is equal to 0, hence,
every minimax strategy should guarantee a payoff of at least 0. In the following, we bound the
payoff of the game between x∗ and x′i in terms of pi’s and qi’s as follows
uAi (x
∗,x′i) ≤ −(1− qi)
2, (57)
∀ω 6= i uAω (x
∗,x′i) ≤ 2qω.
Given that the payoff of x∗ is at least 0, we conclude the following inequality
pi(1− qi)
2 ≤
n∑
ω=1
2pωqω
k
.
By definition, uAi (x
∗,x′i) is specified by the following formula
PrπA∼x∗
πB∼x
∗
[vi(πA) > vi(T (πB))]− PrπA∼x∗
πB∼x
∗
[vi(πA) < vi(T (πB))].
In order to prove Inequality (57), we consider the following two cases
(i). vαi (πA) = v
α
i (πB) = 0. Since v
α
i (T (πB)) is always equal to 1, we have Pr[vi(πA) >
vi(T (πB))]− Pr[vi(πA) < vi(T (πB))] = −1.
(ii). Otherwise, since πA and πB are both drawn from the same strategy, we know that the
expected value of Pr[vi(πA) > vi(πB)] − Pr[vi(πA) < vi(πB)] in this case is 0. Furthermore,
vi(T (πB)) ≥ vi(πB), thus Pr[vi(πA) > vi(T (πB))]− Pr[vi(πA) < vi(T (πB))] ≤ 0.
Since for π ∼ x∗, vαi (π) = 1 with probability qi, the first case happens with probability (1 − qi)
2
and the second case happens with probability 1− (1− qi)
2, we have
PrπA∼x∗
πB∼x
∗
[vi(πA) > vi(T (πB))]− PrπA∼x∗
πB∼x
∗
[vi(πA) > vi(T (πB))] ≤ −(1− qi)
2,
which implies Inequality (57). Next, we show that uAω (x
∗,x′i) ≤ 2qω for all ω 6= i. Again, by
definition, we have
uAω (x
∗,x′i) = PrπA∼x∗
πB∼x
∗
[vω(πA) > vω(T (πB))]− PrπA∼x∗
πB∼x
∗
[vω(πA) < vω(T (πB))].
Note that, vω(T (πB)) = vω(πB) with probability at least 1 −
qω
k
for every ω 6= i and replacing πB
by T (πB) will increase the payoff of the strategy x
∗ by at most 2 (changing the payoff from -1 to
+1). Therefore(
PrπA∼x∗
πB∼x
∗
[vω(πA) > vω(T (πB))] −PrπA∼x∗
πB∼x
∗
[vω(πA) < vω(T (πB))]
)
−(
PrπA∼x∗
πB∼x
∗
[vω(πA) > vω(πB)] −PrπA∼x∗
πB∼x
∗
[vω(πA) < vω(πB)]
)
≤
2qω
k
.
Given both πA and πB are drawn from the same strategy,(
PrπA∼x∗
πB∼x
∗
[vω(πA) > vω(πB)]− PrπA∼x∗
πB∼x
∗
[vω(πA) < vω(πB)]
)
= 0, (58)
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Therefore for every ω 6= i,
uAω (x
∗,x′i) =
(
PrπA∼x∗
πB∼x
∗
[vω(πA) > vω(T (πB))]− PrπA∼x∗
πB∼x
∗
[vω(πA) < vω(T (πB))]
)
≤ 2qω. (59)
By applying Inequalities (57) and (59), we have
uA(x∗,x′i) =
n∑
ω=1
pωu
A
ω (x
∗,x′i)
≤ −pi(1− qi)
2 +
∑
ω 6=i
2pωqω
k
≤ −pi(1− qi)
2 +
n∑
ω=1
2pωqω
k
.
Since x∗ is a minimax strategy, uA(x∗,x′i) ≥ 0 and thus
pi(1− qi)
2 ≤
n∑
ω=1
2pωqω
k
. (60)
By summing Inequality (60) for all 1 ≤ i ≤ k we obtain
∑k
i=1 pi(1− qi)
2 ≤
∑n
ω=1 2pωqω. Therefore,
k∑
i=1
pi(1 + q
2
i − 2qi) ≤
n∑
ω=1
2pωqω
By moving −2qi to the right hand side of the inequality we have
k∑
i=1
pi(1 + q
2
i ) ≤
n∑
ω=1
2pωqω +
k∑
i=1
2piqi
Since q2i is non-negative, we can remove it from the left hand side. Thus,
k∑
i=1
pi ≤
n∑
ω=1
2pωqω +
k∑
i=1
2piqi ≤
n∑
i=1
4piqi
Recall that, by Inequality (55) we have SWα(OPT) ≤
∑k
i=1 pi and by Equation (56) we have
SWα(x∗) =
∑n
i=1 piqi. Hence,
PoCα =
SWα(x∗)
SWα(OPT)
≥
1
4
By applying the 0-1 principle, we conclude that PoC of the ranking duel game with general valuation
function is at least 14 . 
4.2 Compression duel with general valuation function
Compression duel is a dueling games which was introduced by Immorlica et al. [19]. In this game
each pure strategy of the players is a binary search tree with leaf set Ω = {1, 2, . . . , n}. Therefore,
S is the set of all binary search trees that have elements of Ω as leaves and p is a distribution of
probabilities over Ω. Once a request ω ∈ Ω is drawn from the probability distribution p, vw(s)
of each player is determined with f(ds(ω)) where f : N → R≥0 is a non-increasing function and
ds(ω) is the depth of the leaf ω in s. In the following, we show that the PoC of this game can be
arbitrarily close to zero.
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1 2
→ depth 1
→ depth 2
→ depth 3
→ depth 4
Figure 2: Depth of the webpages is 4,4,3,2, respectively.
1 2 3 4
→ depth 1
→ depth 2
→ depth 3
Figure 3: Depth of all the webpages is 3
Theorem 4.3 For every ǫ > 0, there exists an instance of the compression duel, with PoC ≤ ǫ.
Proof. Consider a compression duel game where Ω = {1, 2, 3, 4} and P = 〈14 ,
1
4 ,
1
4 ,
1
4〉. Let the
valuation function f be as follows:
f(d) =


1 if d ≤ 2
ǫ
16 if d = 3
0 if d > 3.
We show that PoC of this game is no more than ǫ. Since the binary tree in Figure 2, has one
leaf with depth 2, one leaf with depth 3, and two leaves with depth 4, the social welfare of its
corresponding strategy is 14 × 1 +
1
4 ×
ǫ
16 =
16+ǫ
64 . Hence, we have
SW(OPT) ≥
16 + ǫ
64
(61)
Next, we prove that the pure strategy x∗ corresponding to the binary tree in Figure 3 is a minimax
strategy of the game. To do so, we show that uA(x
∗,y) ≥ 0 for every pure strategy y. Since the
binary tree corresponding to y should have exactly 4 leaves, it has at most one leaf with depth
lower than 3. Therefore one of the two condition holds for y.
(i). The binary tree corresponding to y has exactly one leaf of depth 2. In this case at least two
of the webpages have depth more than 3, and thus uA(x∗,y) ≥ 0.
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(ii). All the webpages have depth of 3 or more in y. In this case uAω (x
∗,y) ≥ 0 for all ω =
{1, 2, 3, 4}. Hence uA(x∗,y) ≥ 0.
Therefore x∗ is a minimax strategy of the game. The social welfare of x∗ is equal to (14 +
1
4 +
1
4 +
1
4)×
ǫ
16 =
ǫ
16 . By Inequality (61) we have:
PoC ≤
ǫ
16
SW(OPT)
≤
ǫ
16
16+ǫ
64
≤
4ǫ
16 + ǫ
≤ ǫ

4.3 Binary search duel with general valuation function
In this subsection we study the binary search duel and show that the PoC of this game can be Ω( 1
n
).
In this game Ω = {1, 2, . . . , n} and each pure strategy of the players is a binary tree such that its
in-order traversal visits the elements of Ω in the sorted order. Moreover, vω(s) is determined by
f(ds(ω)) where ds(ω) denotes the depth of element ω in the binary search tree corresponding to s
and f : N→ R≥0 is a decreasing function.
Theorem 4.4 For every β > 0 there is an instance of the binary search duel with |Ω| = θ( 1
β
) and
PoC ≤ β.
Proof. Let k = ⌈lg 1
β
⌉+2 and Ω = {1, 2, . . . , n} be the set of webpages where n = 3×2k. Moreover,
let P = 〈15 ,
4
5(n−1) ,
4
5(n−1) , . . . ,
4
5(n−1)〉 and the valuation function f be as follows:
f(d) =


1 if d = 1
ǫ if 2 ≤ d ≤ k + 2
0 if d > k + 2.
Where ǫ is a very small positive number. Note that, since ⌈lg 1
β
⌉ ≥ 1, n is always greater than
or equal to 24. Moreover, The valuation function for the root of the tree is equal to 1. Thus, by
putting the first webpage as the root of the tree we can achieve the social welfare of at least 15 .
Therefore, we have:
SW(OPT) ≥
1
5
(62)
Next, we show that there exists a minimax strategy of this game with social welfare equal to
4
5(n−1) +
5(n−1)−4
5(n−1) ǫ. Consider the pure strategy x
∗ such that plays the binary tree of Figure 4. In
this strategy, depth of the first webpage is always 2 and the depth all other webpages is at most
k+2. Therefore, the social welfare of this strategy is equal to 45(n−1) +
5(n−1)−4
5(n−1) ǫ. Furthermore, we
show that uA(x∗,y) ≥ 0 for all pure strategies y and conclude that x∗ is a minimax strategy. To
do so, we divide the pure strategies into two categories:
(i). The pure strategies that have the first webpage as the root of the tree. Since the in-order
traversal of the webpages in these binary trees should be from first webpage to the last
webpage, all the other webpages are in the right subtree of the root. Therefore in these
strategies depth of at least 2k webpages is higher than k+2. Thus, uAω (x
∗,y) = 1 for at least
2k webpages and uA1 (x
∗,y) = −1. Since n ≥ 24, we have p1 =
1
5 < 2
k × 45(n−1) =
n
3 ×
4
5(n−1) .
Therefore, uA(x∗,y) ≥ 0.
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2k + 1
2k+1 + 11
T1 T2 T3
Figure 4: All the subtrees are complete binary trees with height k. Subtree T1 contains all the
webpages from 2 to 2k, subtree T2 contains all the webpages from 2
k + 2 to 2k+1 and subtree T3
contains all the webpages from 2k+1 + 2 to 3× 2k
(ii). The pure strategies in which depth of the first webpage is more than 1. In these strategies one
webpage ω such that pω =
4
5(n−1) is the root and the value of the valuation function for all
other webpages is at most ǫ. Since the value of the valuation function for all the webpages in
x∗ is at least ǫ and its root has the same probability to be requested, we have uA(x∗,y) ≥ 0.
Since uA(x∗,y) ≥ 0 for all pure strategies y, x∗ is a minimax strategy. This implies that the
following inequality holds for the PoC of this game:
PoC ≤
SW(x∗)
SW(OPT)
≤
4
5(n−1) +
5(n−1)−4
5(n−1) ǫ
1
5
≤
4
n− 1
+ 5ǫ
Since n ≥ 24 and ǫ is small enough, we have:
PoC ≤
4
n− 1
+ 5ǫ ≤
5
n
Recall that, n = 3× 2⌈lg
1
β
⌉+2, therefore 5
n
< β and thus PoC ≤ β. 
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A A feasible solution for the dual linear program
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θ β λ ρ
θ = 0.612275 β1,2 = 1 λ1,5 = 1 ρ1,4 = 0.86974
β1,3 = 1 λ1,6 = 1 ρ2,6 = 0.939106
β1,4 = 0.13026 λ1,7 = 1 ρ3,7 = 0.332976
β2,3 = 1 λ1,8 = 1 ρ3,8 = 1
β2,4 = 1 λ1,9 = 1 ρ3,9 = 1
β2,5 = 1 λ1,10 = 1 ρ4,7 = 0.0537254
β2,6 = 0.0608937 λ2,7 = 1 ρ4,8 = 0.615102
β3,4 = 1 λ2,8 = 1 ρ4,9 = 1
β3,5 = 1 λ2,9 = 1 ρ4,10 = 0.274381
β3,6 = 1 λ2,10 = 1 ρ5,9 = 0.422703
β3,7 = 0.667024 λ3,10 = 1 ρ5,10 = 1
β4,5 = 1 λ4,10 = 0.725619 ρ6,9 = 0.420799
β4,6 = 1 ρ6,10 = 0.394388
β4,7 = 0.946275
β4,8 = 0.384898
β5,6 = 1
β5,7 = 1
β5,8 = 1
β5,9 = 0.577297
β6,7 = 1
β6,8 = 1
β6,9 = 0.579201
β6,10 = 0.605612
β7,8 = 1
β7,9 = 1
β7,10 = 1
β8,9 = 1
β8,10 = 1
β9,10 = 1
Figure 5: Feasible solution for LP 44. In this table we present the non-zero variables of LP 44,
which is the dual program of LP 36. This feasible solution gives us a lower bound for the primal
linear program.
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